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I. INTRODUCTION
The modem doctrine of competency came into being in mid-seventeenth
century England, where, under the common law, an incompetent defendant
could not be forced to stand trial.' Although most of the original rationales
for employing the competency doctrine are now obsolete, several modem
justifications support its continuing existence. In the United States, both
criminal law and civil law recognize the value of the doctrine, and each has
distinct legal standards for assessing competency. On the other hand,
arbitration, a unique form of alternative dispute resolution that is often used
as a substitute for a civil trial, appears to completely ignore the issue of
competency. Currently, no rules or regulations exist that require a party to an
arbitration proceeding to be competent before an arbitration proceeding
begins. Because arbitration has never acknowledged competency nor adopted
a specific test to actually assess competency, persons who would be declared
mentally incompetent under civil competency standards may nevertheless be
forced to adjudicate a civil claim in an arbitration proceeding. This may
result in a mentally-ill party being subjected to a patently unfair proceeding
due to a power imbalance created by differences in mental ability.
This note proposes that specific competency standards be put in place
before a party is forced to submit to arbitration and explores options for an
appropriate competency test or standard. First, this note outlines the history
of the competency doctrine as well as modem standards of competency in
both civil and criminal law, focusing on the criminal competency standards
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the United States Supreme Court set forth in Dusky v. United StateS2 and
Drope v. Missouri.3 Then this note addresses the relatively new field of
arbitration, its basic principles, and the fact that arbitration lacks guidelines
for how to respond to mentally incompetent parties. Because arbitration lacks
the procedural safeguards that exist in civil proceedings, because parties to
an arbitration have no legal right to appointed counsel, and because
arbitration is binding and subject to limited appeal, this note proposes that
competency standards are necessary in arbitration proceedings. Next, this
note argues that the Dusky-Drope standard used in criminal law is the
appropriate standard to be used in the arbitration context. Last, this note
explores the ways in which the new competency standard might be
implemented and properly enforced by arbitrators.
II. THE ORIGINS OF THE COMPETENCY DOCTRINE
Competency to stand trial, long a part of legal due process, is a concept
that arose early in criminal jurisprudence, allowing a person who is
considered unable to participate in his or her defense on account of mental or
physical illness to postpone trial. 4 In fact, the doctrine that bars the trial,
conviction, or punishment of an incompetent criminal defendant has a long
history in the American legal system.5 Persons who are mentally retarded are
included in this category. However, because the issues raised by mental
retardation are distinct from those raised by mental illness and require
different methods of testing for competency, this article analyzes problems of
incompetency to stand trial resulting only from mental illness. 6
Historically, English common law allowed an arraignment, trial,
judgment, or execution of an alleged capital offender to be stayed if he or she
2 Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960).
3 Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975).
4 Id. at 171.
5 Stephen Golding et al., Assessment and Conceptualization of Competency to Stand
Trial: Preliminary Data on the Interdisciplinary Fitness Interview, 8 LAW & HUM.
BEHAv. 321, 322 (1984). For a history of the rule, see, e.g., Youtsey v. United States, 97
F. 937, 940-44 (6th Cir. 1899) ("[I]t is fundamental that an insane person can neither
plead to an arraignment, be subjected to a trial, or, after trial, receive judgment, or, after
judgment, undergo punishment."). ,
6 Ronald Roesch & Patricia A. Zapf, Defining and Assessing Competency to Stand
Trial, in HANDBOOK OF FoRENsIc PSYCHOLOGY 327 (Irving B. Weiner et al. eds., 2d ed.
1999) (noting that mentally retarded defendants must be assessed using special tools and
procedures).
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"be(came) absolutely mad."7 Sir William Blackstone, renowned British judge
and politician, reasoned that a person who became "mad" after committing
an offense should not be arraigned for it "because he is not able to plead to it
with that advice and caution that he ought."8 Blackstone further opined that a
defendant who becomes "mad" after the commission of an offense should not
be tried, for "how can he make his own defense?" 9
During the formation of the competency doctrine in England, self-
representation, rather than representation by counsel, was the common
practice.10 In serious criminal cases, in fact, the law required the defendant to
"appear before the court in his own person and conduct his own cause in his
own words."II Therefore, in many cases, a defendant stood alone before the
court. Because a defendant could be deprived of his liberty, or even his life, it
was imperative that the defendant be competent.12
While today criminal defendants who face an actual penalty of
imprisonment have a legal right to counsel, justifications remain for the
modem competency doctrine. 13 Most importantly, maintaining the doctrine
serves to prevent general "unfairness" to a criminal defendant or a civil
litigant.14 Ensuring competency in a criminal case also helps to prevent
7 Roesch et al., supra note 1, at 1.
8 Drope, 420 U.S. at 171 (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *24).
9 Bruce J. Winick, Reforming Incompetency to Stand Trial and Plead Guilty: A
Restated Proposal and a Response to Professor Bonnie, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
571, 574 (1995).
10 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 823 (1975). For an analysis of the historical
origins of the right to counsel, see Bruce J. Winick, Forfeiture ofAttorneys' Fees Under
RICO and CCE and the Right to Counsel of Choice: The Constitutional Dilemma and
How to AvoidIt, 43 U. MIAMIL. REV. 765, 786-99 (1989).
11 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 823 (quoting 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 211 (2d ed. 1909)).
12 Id.
13 See generally Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (holding that defendants in
federal court who face an actual penalty of imprisonment have a right to appointed
counsel). For an understanding of a criminal defendant's right to counsel under state law,
see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (in which the United States Supreme
Court unanimously ruled that state courts are required under the Sixth Amendment of the
United States Constitution to provide counsel in criminal cases for indigent defendants).
14 Winick, supra note 9, at 575-76. See also Caleb Foote, A Comment on Pre-Trial
Commitment of Criminal Defendants, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 832, 834 (1960) (noting that
some scholars view the common-law competency rule as a rule that "did not evolve from
philosophical notions of punishability, but rather has deep roots in the common law as a
by-product of the ban against trials in absentia; the mentally incompetent defendant,
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erroneous convictions that might result from requiring a defendant to stand
trial while significantly impaired by mental illness.15 Further, a person who is
mentally impaired may not be able to communicate critical facts to counsel
or the court. 16 The competency doctrine also preserves the dignity of the trial
process, which would be threatened by trying persons "who lack a
meaningful understanding of the nature of the proceedings."' 7 Preserving the
competency doctrine thus ensures public respect and confidence in the
judicial process and legal system.' 8 For these reasons, the Supreme Court has
held that the bar against trying an incompetent defendant is "fundamental to
an adversary system ofjustice."l 9
III. MODERN COMPETENCY STANDARDS
In the United States today, the test for competency depends on the nature
of the proceeding. Specifically, criminal law has different standards and tests
for competency than civil law, perhaps due to the basic differences between
criminal and civil law. Criminal law involves the prosecution of an
individual by the government for any act that has been classified as a
crime.20 As punishment, persons convicted of crimes may face fines, jail
time, capital punishment, or a combination of these punishments. 21 In
contrast, civil law involves individuals or organizations who are seeking to
resolve private legal disputes.22 Generally, persons found liable in a civil
case may not be incarcerated; however, they may have to pay money or give
up property. 23 In the realm of contract-based civil litigation, persons found
guilty of a breach of contract may have to pay damages or restitution to
another party, or may be forced to perform in accordance with the terms of
the contract (specific performance) or to refrain from action (injunction). 24
though physically present in the courtroom, is in reality afforded no opportunity to defend
himself').
15 Winick, supra note 9, at 575.
16 Id
17 Id. at 576.
18 Id
19 Drope, 420 U.S. at 172.
20 CORNELL UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE,
http://topics.law.comell.edu/wex/Criminal-law (last visited March 30, 2011).
21 See id.
22 Id
23 Id
24 See 11 JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 55.1 (2005).
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The law regarding competency is significantly more developed in the
criminal context, where judges have the benefit of a wealth of U.S. Supreme
Court precedent that has created specific competency standards. While
judges in the civil realm are not completely without guidance, the case law is
inchoate, and only one of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure guides judges
on the issue of competency.
A. Competency in Criminal Law: Dusky and Drope
It is well established that convicting an accused person while he is
legally incompetent violates due process. 25 However, it was not until Dusky
v. United States that the Supreme Court of the United States, in a per curiam
opinion, established the standard of competency required to be found fit to
proceed to criminal trial. 26 To properly stand trial under Dusky, a defendant
must have "sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding" and must also have "a rational
as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him."27 In Drope
v. Missouri, the Supreme Court refined this standard by holding that a
defendant must not only be able to understand the nature of the proceedings
against him and consult with counsel but must also be able to "assist in
preparing his defense" to properly stand trial.28
Altogether, Dusky and Drope resulted in a three-part scheme for
determining mental competency to stand trial. First, a court must determine,
by a preponderance of the evidence, whether the defendant suffers from a
mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent
that he is unable to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of
rational understanding. The second question before a court is whether the
defendant presently has a rational and factual understanding of the
proceedings against him. Third, a court must determine whether the
defendant has the present ability to assist in preparing his own defense.
25 Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966). In that case, the Court, citing Bishop
v. United States, 350 U.S. 961 (1956), noted that "[i]n the event a sufficient doubt exists
as to his present competence such a hearing must be held" and that "the conviction of an
accused person while he is legally incompetent violates due process."26 Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402.
2 71d. See also Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 368 (1996) (holding that "[t]he
test for competence to stand trial . . . is whether the defendant has the present ability to
understand the charges against him and communicate effectively with defense counsel.").
28 See Drope, 420 U.S. at 171.
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While Dusky and Drope address a defendant's competency to stand trial,
criminal law also recognizes other forms of legal competency. Some
competencies recognized in criminal law include: the capacity to knowingly
waive Miranda rights prior to questioning by law enforcement officers,
competency to plead guilty, and competency to stand trial.29 All of the
different "types" of legal competencies, however, have in common a
"reference to human capacities that must be assessed in the process of
applying legal criteria for competency decisions." 30 As the Court in Drope
noted, "Whether a defendant is capable of understanding the proceedings and
assisting counsel is dependent upon evidence of the defendant's irrational
behavior, his demeanor in court, and any prior medical opinions on his
competence." 31 None of these factors alone, however, is determinative, but
any one of them is sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt about a defendant's
competence. 32
Generally, courts do not expect defendants to be absolute "paragons of
mental health." 33 Therefore, a defendant may be suffering from a diagnosed
psychiatric disorder such as schizophrenia, or may have a serious physical
illness that affects mental capacity, and may still be found competent to stand
trial.34
29 THOMAS GRisso, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES: FORENSIC ASSESSMENTS AND
INSTRUMENTS 2 (1986).
30 1d. at 7.
31 Drope, 420 U.S. at 180; see also 18 U.S.C. § 4241 ("[t]he defendant or the
attorney for the Government may file a motion for a hearing to determine the mental
competency of the defendant. The court shall grant the motion, or shall order such a
hearing on its own motion, if there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may
presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally
incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of
the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense.") (emphasis added).
32 Drope, 420 U.S. at 180. See also Miles v. Stainer, 108 F.3d 1109, 1112 (9th Cir.
1997) (in a case in which a criminal defendant had been evaluated by three doctors
previous to trial, who had noted that the defendant had past problems with competency
and consistently failed to take his psychotropic mediation, the Ninth Circuit found that
the lower court erred in failing to assess his competency, noting that "[s]ince the state
court file contained doctors' warnings that Miles' competence depended on medication
which he often refused to take, it was incumbent upon the state trial judge to ask him
whether he had been taking his medication before accepting his guilty plea").
33 Golding et al., supra note 5, at 322.
3 4 Id
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B. Competency in Civil Law: Rule 17's Under-Enforced Standard
Although in practice it is generally unenforced, civil law imposes a ban
allowing an incompetent individual to sue or be sued.35 The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure require litigants who are deemed to have mental health
issues to have counsel or a guardian ad litem before proceeding with any
lawsuit.36 Specifically, Rule 17 of the Federal Rules provides that "the court
must appoint a guardian ad litem [for an] . . . incompetent person .. . who is
unrepresented in an action . . . ."37 Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the capacity of one to sue as a representative of another is usually
determined by state law.38
Legal competencies that are recognized in civil cases generally require
logical decisions based substantially on a person's physical or psychological
capabilities.39 For example, competencies recognized in civil law include,
among others, parental competency, competency to care for self or care for
property, competency to enter into a contract, and competency to execute a
will.40
Rule 17 also addresses the due process concerns that exist in the civil
realm. As the Sixth Circuit stated, "Whereas due process protects
incompetent criminal defendants by imposing an outright prohibition on trial,
it protects incompetent civil parties by requiring the court to appoint
guardians to protect their interests and by judicially ensuring that the
35 See FED. R. Civ. P. 17(c); see also 53 AM. JuR. 2D Mentally Impaired Persons §
158 (2006) (noting that "although an incompetent person may have suffered an injury,
and thus have a justiciable interest in the controversy," such person lacks the legal
authority to sue, and because of this, the law grants another party the capacity to sue on
his or her behalf).
36 See id.; see also Wesla Fed. Credit Union v. Henderson, 655 So. 2d 691, 694 (La.
Ct. App. 1995) (holding that a mentally incompetent person has no procedural capacity to
be sued, and that a curator appointed by state court was a proper defendant in an action to
enforce an obligation against a mental incompetent).
37 FED. R. Civ. P. 17(c) (stating that only four categories of individuals may sue or
defend on behalf of a minor or an incompetent person: a general guardian, a committee, a
conservator, or a "like" fiduciary, and also that "[a] minor or an incompetent person who
does not have a duly appointed representative may sue by a next friend or by a guardian
ad litem. The court must appoint a guardian ad litem-or issue another appropriate
order-to protect a minor or incompetent person who is unrepresented in an action.").
38 See Thomas v. Humfield, 916 F.2d 1032, 1035 (5th Cir. 1990); see also in re
Kjellsen, 53 F.3d 944, 946 (8th Cir. 1995).
39 See Grisso, supra note 29, at 5.
40 Id.
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guardians protect those interests." 4 1 Therefore, even in the absence of Rule
17's mandate, due process considerations have supported conducting an
inquiry into competency. 42
Unfortunately, Rule 17 does not technically require or obligate courts to
assess competency.43 In Ferelli v. River Manor Health Care Center, the
Second Circuit, noting that a judgment that is entered against a mentally
incompetent defendant who is represented by a guardian or a guardian ad
litem may be "subject to collateral attack at a later date," further stated that:
[a]lthough we do not find that Rule 17(c) requires courts to inquire into the
necessity of appointing a guardian ad litem absent verifiable evidence of
mental incapacity, we also note that nothing in that rule prevents a district
court from exercising its discretion to consider sua sponte the
appropriateness of appointing a guardian ad litem for a litigant whose
behavior raises a significant question regarding his or her mental
competency.44
As for pro se litigants, the Ferelli court held that "absent actual
documentation or testimony by a mental health professional, a court of
record, or a relevant public agency, the district court is not required to
undertake an inquiry into apro se litigant's mental capacity." 45
Further, Rule 17 provides no guidance regarding the specific
circumstances that warrant a mental competency inquiry, or whether a pro se
41 United States v. Mandycz, 447 F.3d 951, 962 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing
Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 160 (1943)); see also Berrios v. N.Y. City
Hous. Auth., 564 F.3d 130, 134 (where owner of claim is an incompetent person, unless
that claimant is properly represented by guardian ad litem, friend, or other suitable
fiduciary, and that representative is an attorney or is represented by an attorney, a court
should not issue a ruling as to whether complainant states a claim upon which relief can
be granted).
42 See Ferrelli v. River Manor Health Care Ctr., 323 F.3d 196, 203 (2d Cir. 2003)
(holding that due process considerations attend incompetency finding and subsequent
appointment of guardian ad litem under rules of civil procedure); see also Thomas v.
Humfield, 916 F.2d 1032 (5th Cir. 1990) (indicating that, as to the question of minimum
due process protections in determining whether an individual is incompetent to sue or
defend, a court is not required to use a domiciliary state's procedures for determining
competency or capacity because the court may use any procedure meeting the
requirements of due process).
43 See Ferrelli, 323 F.3d at 203.
44 Id. (emphasis added).
45 Id. at 202.
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plaintiff should receive special consideration. 46 Because courts are not
mandated to inquire into a pro se litigant's competency, and because
guidelines for circumstances which would warrant such an inquiry are non-
existent, it is probable that an incompetent person may be forced to
adjudicate a civil claim despite the Federal Rules' concern for civil
competency.47
Even when courts do address the question of competency, however, they
have generally been reluctant to find an individual incompetent to pursue a
legal action or to be sued civilly and seem to impose a high standard for a
person to qualify as incompetent. 48 For example, in one case, the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan held that, according
to Michigan state law, a person may not be assumed incompetent "merely
because" he or she is in a mental hospital. 49 Therefore, even if a court does
inquire into a civil litigant's competency, a litigant who is psychologically
unfit to litigate may nevertheless be forced to adjudicate his claim because of
the fact that courts impose such high standards for reaching the status of
legal incompetency.50
46 See Jacobs v. Cnty. of Westchester, 2005 WL 2172254, at *1 (2d Cir. Sept. 7,
2005) (holding that a district court has no obligation to inquire sua sponte into pro se
plantiff's mental competence, even when court observes behavior that may suggest
mental incompetency).
47 See id.
48 See Yacabonis v. Gilvickas, 101 A.2d 690, 692 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1954) (stating that
"[a]n adjudication of incompetency is not an adjudication of lunacy" and that "if the
defense wants to excuse the absence of defendant at the trial, it must actually be shown
that he is incapable of testifying").
49 Huebner v. Ochberg, 87 F.R.D. 449, 456 (E.D. Mich. 1980) ("No determination
that a person requires treatment, no order of court authorizing hospitalization or
alternative treatment, nor any form of admission to a hospital shall give rise to a
presumption of, constitute a finding of, or operate as an adjudication of legal
incompetence.").
50 See Walker v. Frericks, 354 S.E.2d 915, 919 (S.C. Ct. App. 1987) (indicating
courts' general reluctance to find individuals legally incompetent in civil cases, and
indicating that this reluctance may be due to courts' concern in ensuring that a guardian
ad litem is not appointed to a competent person, as this would deprive them of the right to
control their own litigation); see also Graham v. Graham, 240 P.2d 564, 566 (Wash.
1952) ("There is something fundamental in the matter of a litigant being able to use his
personal judgment and intelligence in connection with a lawsuit affecting him, and in not
having a guardian's judgment and intelligence substituted relative to the litigation
affecting the alleged incompetent.").
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C. Competency in Contract Law: Strict Competency Requirements
General rules of contract law stipulate that a party must be competent in
order to enter into a legally binding contract.51 The Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, for example, provides that "a natural person who manifests or
consents to a transaction has full legal capacity to incur contractual duties
unless he or she is under guardianship, an infant, mentally ill or defective, or
intoxicated." 52
Contract law currently recognizes that there are a wide variety of mental
incompetencies such as congenital deficiencies in intelligence, mental
deterioration due to old age, effects of brain damage, and mental illnesses
evidenced by symptoms such as delusions, hallucinations, delirium,
confusion, and depression. 53 However, according to the Restatement, if a
person has not been deemed incompetent and appointed a guardian, that
party is presumed to be competent to enter into a contract.54 Further, where
51 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15 (1981) (stating that "(1) A
person incurs only voidable contractual duties by entering into a transaction if by reason
of mental illness or defect (a) he is unable to understand in a reasonable manner the
nature and consequences of the transaction, or (b) he is unable to act in a reasonable
manner in relation to the transaction and the other party has reason to know of his
condition") (emphasis added); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 12 (1)-
(2) (1981) (stating that "No one can be bound by contract who has not legal capacity to
incur at least voidable contractual duties. Capacity to contract may be partial and its
existence in respect of a particular transaction may depend upon the nature of the
transaction or upon other circumstances.").
52 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 12 (2) (1981); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 12 cmt. a (1981) (stating that "[c]apacity ...
means the legal power which a normal person would have under the same circumstances"
and that "[i]ncapacity may be total, as in cases where extreme physical or mental
disability prevents manifestation of assent to the transaction, or in cases of mental illness
after a guardian has been appointed" and also that "[i]ncapacity sometimes relates only to
particular types of transactions; on the other hand, persons whose capacity is limited in
most circumstances may be bound by particular types of transactions.").
53 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15 cmt. b (1981).
54 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15 cmt. b (1981) ("[w]here no
guardian has been appointed, there is full contractual capacity in any case unless the
mental illness or defect has affected the particular transaction: a person may be able to
understand almost nothing, or only simple or routine transactions, or he may be
incompetent only with respect to a particular type of transaction.. . .Where a person has
some understanding of a particular transaction which is affected by mental illness or
defect, the controlling consideration is whether the transaction in its result is one which a
reasonably competent person might have made.").
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there has been no previous adjudication of incompetency, the burden of proof
is on the party asserting the incompetency.55
This note, however, is not concerned with the hypothetical situation in
which a party has entered into a contract that is voidable by reason of
incapacity to contract. Instead, this note is concerned with the question of
whether contract law considers competency when it comes to performance of
a contract. Specifically, this note addresses the situation in which a party has
entered into a contract which contains a binding arbitration clause, has
entered into said contract with full legal capacity to do so, and later becomes
mentally ill. Simply put, this note addresses the question of whether a party
who validly entered into a contract to arbitrate must participate in the
arbitration proceeding if that party became mentally ill before the arbitration
proceeding.
While contract law is, in a sense, the "child" of general civil law,
contract law differs from general civil law slightly in its treatment of
mentally-ill parties. In the situation of mentally incompetent parties who
have entered into a legally enforceable contract, the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts states:
Where the contract is made on fair terms and the other party is without
knowledge of the mental illness or defect, the power of avoidance [due to
mental disease or defect] . .. terminates to the extent that the contract has
been so performed in whole or in part or the circumstances have so changed
that avoidance would be unjust. In such a case a court may grant relief as
justice requires.56
While the Restatement is not explicit on this point, it seems to imply that
if a person becomes mentally ill after having entered into a valid contract,
and if allowing the mentally ill party to avoid performing his contractual
duties would be "unjust," a court may force the mentally ill person to comply
with his contractual duties.
55 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15 cmt. c (1981) (stating that, for proof
of incompetency, "[p]roof of irrational or unintelligent behavior is essential; almost any
conduct of the person may be relevant, as may lay and expert opinions and prior and
subsequent adjudications of incompetency. Age, bodily infirmity or disease, use of
alcohol or drugs, and illiteracy may bolster other evidence of incompetency. Other facts
have significance when there is mental illness or defect but some understanding: absence
of independent advice, confidential or fiduciary relationship, undue influence, fraud, or
secrecy...").
56 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15(2) (1981) (emphasis added).
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The rationale behind the rule, as the comments to the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts explain, stems from two important but conflicting
policy concerns.57 First, the law strives to protect "justifiable expectations
and . . . security of transactions."5 8 An important competing concern,
however, is to protect persons who are "unable to protect themselves against
imposition."59 However, because courts may grant relief "as justice
requires," it is up to individual courts to determine which of the competing
policy concerns is the most compelling in any given case.60
The Restatement also addresses the situation in which an incompetent
person regains full capacity at a later date. In that case, the newly competent
individual may affirm or disaffirm the contract, or the power to affirm or
disaffirm may be exercised on his behalf by a guardian or after his death by
personal representative. 61 However, there may be related obligations
imposed by law independently of contract which cannot be disaffirmed. 62
Overall, contract law is concerned with fairness and resolves any
questions regarding mental competency either to enter into a contract or to
execute contractual duties under the purview of what is most equitable for all
parties involved.
IV. COMPETENCY AND ARBITRATION
Arbitration, a relatively unique form of alternative dispute resolution, has
grown in appeal in recent years as a substitute for civil court-based litigation.
Perhaps due to its immaturity in the legal world, arbitration has yet to set any
standards relating to a disputant's competency, and seems to presume from
5 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15 cmt. a (1981).
58 Id.
59 d
60 See id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15 cmt. a:
[E]ach policy has sometimes prevailed to a greater extent than is stated ... at one
extreme, it has been said that a lunatic has no capacity to contract because he has no
mind; this view has given way to a better understanding of mental phenomena and to
the doctrine that contractual obligation depends on manifestation of assent rather
than on mental assent . . .. [a]t the other extreme, it has been asserted that mental
incompetency has no effect on a contract unless other grounds of avoidance are
present, such as fraud, undue influence, or gross inadequacy of consideration; it is
now widely believed that such a rule gives inadequate protection to the incompetent
and his family, particularly where the contract is entirely executory.
61 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15 cmt. d.
62 See id.
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the outset that parties to an arbitration proceeding are indeed competent.
Competency standards are vitally necessary, however, because of the lack of
procedural safeguards in the arbitration process, because parties have no
constitutional right to counsel, and because arbitration is almost always
binding and subject to very limited appeal.
A. Arbitration: Purpose and Process
Arbitration has been defined as "a process in which the neutral [party]
hears evidence and renders a decision on the merits in a manner similar to
court adjudication." 63
Procedurally, an individual has technically entered into an "arbitration
agreement," or a "submission to arbitration," whenever two or more persons
have agreed that a dispute or a potential dispute between them .may be
decided in a legally binding way by an impartial party or parties upon
evidence presented. 64 The disputed issue is then presented before a neutral
party, who may be selected by the parties. 65 The neutral party, the arbitrator,
makes a decision, which is called an award. 66
There is no doubt that this unique process of arbitrating claims has grown
in appeal as a substitute for court-based litigation.67 As stated by Chief
Justice Warren E. Burger at a meeting of the American Arbitration
Association, "In terms of cost, time, and human wear and tear, arbitration is
vastly better than conventional litigation for many kinds of cases." 68 Because
arbitration clauses are now the standard method for resolving disputes in
many consumer contracts, such as insurance and medical contracts, almost
63 MARK PARTRIDGE, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: AN ESSENTIAL
COMPETENCY FOR LAWYERS 38 (Oxford University Press 2009).
64 RONALD BERNSTEIN & DEREK WOOD, HANDBOOK OF ARBITRATION PRACTICE 9
(Sweet and Maxwell 1993) (1987).
65 Id
66 Id
67 See PARTRIDGE, supra note 63, at 9-10 (citing a 2006 American Bar Association
study which found that only 15% of the Fortune 1000 companies interviewed favored
litigation over ADR, and that 58% of respondents to the study believed that arbitration
reduced costs); see also PARTRIDGE, supra note 63, at 6-7 (noting that a study of general
counsel reported in the October 2004 issue of Corporate Legal Times indicated that 40%
of clients favored arbitration, and 60% favored mediation over court litigation as a means
to resolve commercial disputes).
68Id. at 71 (citing AAA Looks at the Next Century, AMERICAN ARBITRATION
ASSOCIATION HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 8-9 (Thomas E. Carbonneau et
al., eds., 2006)).
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everyone enters into an agreement to arbitrate at some point during their
lifetime, whether aware of it or not.69
Generally, litigants who independently choose arbitration as a method of
resolving a dispute do so due to the high costs, adversarial nature, and time
requirements of traditional litigation.70 One of the oft-cited benefits of
arbitration is that it offers a binding result whereby the parties must comply
with the decision of the arbitrator; however, some arbitration schemes may
produce a nonbinding result in which compliance with the decision depends
solely on the cooperation of the losing party.7' Another regularly cited
benefit of arbitration is that arbitrators may be selected based on special
knowledge of an industry or based on knowledge of applicable law.72 This
may be beneficial in certain circumstances, because a judge in a courtroom
generally has no special knowledge of the subject matter underlying any
given case. 73 Further, a litigant who is concerned with confidentiality may
prefer arbitration over civil litigation as arbitration hearings, as opposed to
court hearings, are private and can be kept confidential. 74
However, not all scholars have such a positive outlook on arbitration,
and have voiced concerns on the policy level about the privatization aspect of
arbitration specifically, and alternative dispute resolution generally.75 For
69 Michelle Canerday, Alternative Dispute Resolution: The Federal Arbitration Act
and Resolving Disputes in Arbitration Versus a Court Proceeding, 81 DENV. U. L. REV.
597, 597 (2004); see also John D. Feerick, Toward Uniform Standards of Conduct for
Mediators, 38 S. TEx. L. REV. 455, 456 (1997) (noting that alternative dispute resolution
is currently being employed in many different areas of law, such as consumer disputes,
employer disputes, public policy conflicts, and business and commercial disputes).
70 See Feerick, supra note 69, at 456 (emphasizing the growing popularity of
arbitration and noting that more than half of the states have "formally incorporated ADR
methods other than arbitration into their systems through statewide legislation, court
rules, or policies" and that most states offer mediation for family issues such as custody,
visitation, and divorce. Feerick also notes that "virtually every state has experimented
with ADR in one or more of its courts" and that "[a]t the federal level, eighty out of
ninety-four district courts have established some form of ADR program." (citing House
Considers New Court Arbitration Bill, WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP., June 1995, at
119).
71 PARTRIDGE, supra note 63, at 43.
72 Id
73 Id
74 Id
75 Jean Sternlight, Is Alternative Dispute Resolution Consistent with the Rule of
Law? Lessons from Abroad, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 569, 570 (2007) (noting other concerns
scholars share regarding the use of Alternative Dispute Resolution, such as that treating
disputes as matters of individual concern may serve to eliminate public accountability,
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example, critics state that the privatization of dispute resolution is
problematic because public trials and published opinions are necessary to
"protect and enhance individual rights" and because treating disputes as
private matters eliminates public accountability and may increase the
expression and impact of prejudice.76 It is notable, however, that while
scholars have criticized many aspects of arbitration, there is a general lack of
scholarly work criticizing mental competency standards in arbitration
proceedings.
B. Arbitration Without Competency Standards: Comparison to Civil
Trial
Although civil trials and arbitration are similar in that they both strive to
create resolutions for civil claims, important and pertinent differences. exist
which must be further explored. Due to these critical differences, this note
argues that parties to an arbitration are generally deprived the benefit of
certain procedural protections which would be afforded to civil litigants.
1. Arbitration Lacks the Procedural Safeguards That Exist in
Civil Proceedings
The arbitration process is intended to be relatively informal, as opposed
to trial, which is a highly formalized process meant to protect vulnerable
parties and result in a just and "fair" result. 77 While court hearings are
governed by the rules of civil procedure applicable to that court, arbitration is
governed by applicable rules of arbitration institutions and provider
organizations, such as the National Academy of Arbitrators, the American
Arbitration Association, and JAMS. 78 The Federal Arbitration Act provides
and that alternative dispute resolution, when privatized, fails to serve an "important
educational function.").
76 Id. See also Deborah R. Hensler, Our Courts, Ourselves: How the Alternative
Dispute Resolution Movement Is Re-shaping Our Legal System, 108 PENN ST. L. REv.
165, 170-76 (2003) (discussing the community justice, court administration, and business
interest strands of the alternative dispute resolution movement, and noting that the
establishment of dispute resolution processes may weaken the position of less powerful
members of society).
77 See Theodore 0. Rogers, Jr., The Procedural Diferences Between Litigating in
Court and Arbitration: Who Benefits?, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 633, 634 (2001).
78 PARTRIDGE, supra note 63, at 38.
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the legal framework for those disputes that arise out of interstate
commerce.79
While the precise characteristics of arbitration proceedings differ from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, in general, a party to an arbitration proceeding
does not have the same right to pre-trial discovery procedures to which civil
litigants are afforded.80 In arbitration, discovery is the exception, not the
norm. 81 In fact, courts may not order discovery in aid of arbitration unless the
movant has demonstrated "extraordinary circumstances" or special need or
hardship.82 Although arbitration pleading requirements are more lenient than
those in court, depositions are much more limited in arbitration.83 As to the
arbitration proceeding itself, it lacks the strict rules of evidence and
procedure by which a court is bound. 84 Further, arbitrators generally prefer to
hear all available evidence, even if that evidence might be prejudicial or
irrelevant.85 Also, in-court trials have one very important feature that
arbitration does not: an impartial and carefully selected jury.86
79 Id. at 155.
80 See Miller Brewing Co. v. Ft. Worth Distrib. Co. Inc., 781 F.2d 494, 498 (5th Cir.
1986); see also Graig Shipping Co. v. Midland Overseas Shipping Corp., 259 F. Supp.
929, 931 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (stating that a party "may not invoke arbitration and yet seek
pre-trial discovery going to the merits.... [A]ny attempt to go to the merits and to retain
still the right to arbitration is clearly impermissible"); Commercial Solvents Corp. v.
Louisiana Liquid Fertilizer Co., 20 F.R.D. 359, 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) ("[Bly voluntarily
becoming a party to a contract in which arbitration was the agreed mode for settling
disputes thereunder respondent chose to avail itself of procedures peculiar to the arbitral
process rather than those used in judicial determinations.").
81 See Greenstreet, Inc. v. Checks Are Us, 806 So. 2d 1203, 1207 (Ala. 2001)
(noting the difficulty in harmonizing the fact that arbitration is a method of dispute
resolution where discovery is not the norm, and the fact that hearings without adequate
time for discovery "are inappropriate.").
82 See Hendler & Murray v. Lambert, 147 A.D.2d 442, 443 (2d Dep't 1989); see
also Balfour, Guthrie & Co., Ltd. v. Commercial Metals Co., 93 Wash. 2d 199, 204
(1980); Thomas O'Connor & Co., Inc. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 697 F. Supp. 563, 567 (D.
Mass. 1988); Gresham v. Norris, 304 F. Supp. 2d 795, 796 (E.D. Va. 2004).
83 See Rogers, supra note 77, at 635.
84 Id. at 637; see also Geraldine Scott Moohr, Opting In Or Opting Out: The New
Legal Process or Arbitration, 77 WASH. U. L. Q. 1087, 1093 (1999).
85 Moohr, supra note 84, at 1093 (noting that parties to an arbitration may stipulate
to any procedures, including the scope of judicial review, but that adding procedures that
mimic those available in litigation will add costs and "forfeit[] finality," which are the
very defining characteristics of arbitration); see also Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon &
Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 709 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting parties may stipulate to whatever
procedures they want, "short of authorizing trial by battle or ordeal or, more doubtfully,
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Because arbitration is a "creature of contract" and, therefore subject to
stipulations, parties to an arbitration proceeding are able to circumvent the
procedural traditions described above, such as the default rules of discovery
and evidence.87 However, despite the fact that parties to an arbitration
proceeding have the ability to change these default rules, it is doubtful that
mentally incompetent people will realize that they may implement
procedures which mimic those available in litigation.88
2. Parties to an Arbitration Have No Constitutional Right to
Counsel
The lack of competency standards in arbitration is particularly egregious
because a party to an arbitration proceeding has no constitutional or
contractual right to counsel. 89 Looking to competency standards in criminal
law can help illustrate exactly why the lack of competency standards in
arbitration is so egregious.
In the criminal context, the United States Supreme Court has interpreted
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution as mandating that
indigent defendants in federal court be provided counsel unless that right is
"competently and intelligently waived." 90 The Court has also extended this
rule to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment.91
The Court held in Indiana v. Edwards that the "Constitution permits
States to insist upon representation by counsel for those competent enough to
stand trial under Dusky but who still suffer from severe mental illness to the
by a panel of three monkeys"); LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 888
(9th Cir. 1997) (holding that a court must honor an arbitration agreement under which
parties agreed to a standard of judicial scrutiny exceeding that allowed by Federal
Arbitration Act).
86 Rogers, supra note 77, at 638.
87 Moohr, supra note 84, at 1093.
88 See id.
89 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340-43 (1963); see also Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938).
90 Gideon, 372 U.S. at 340; see also U.S. CONsT. amend. VI, which provides: "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence." In Gideon, the Court explained that this should be construed to
mean that in federal courts counsel must be provided for defendants unable to employ
counsel unless the right is competently and intelligently waived.
91 Gideon, 372 U.S. at 340.
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point where they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by
themselves." 92
In Edwards, the Court noted that "[m]ental illness itself is not a unitary
concept," which suggested that a single standard for competency to go to trial
and competency to proceed pro se may be inappropriate. 93 The Court also
questioned whether allowing mentally-ill defendants to represent themselves
would undermine their dignity and result in a spectacle rather than a fair
trial.94 Therefore, the Court held that the Constitution supports a higher
competency standard for proceeding pro se than for proceeding to trial with
representation. 95
Although the Court in Edwards endorsed applying a higher competency
standard for pro se defendants, it did not endorse Indiana's proposed
standard for self-representation competency and failed to propose its own
standard for self-representation competency. 96 Because of the lack of a
proposed standard, some scholars have noted that the Edwards decision is
problematic for several reasons. 97 First, it not only allows paternalism to rule
judicial decisions, but it also allows judges to decide whether someone is
92 Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 178 (2008). Edwards illustrates that
competency is not a static concept. In that case, defendant Edwards drew and fired a gun
at a store security officer after attempting to steal two pairs of shoes. Procedurally,
Edwards underwent three competency hearings, two trials, and two determinations of his
right to self-representation. However, at both criminal trials, Edwards was found
competent to stand trial but not to represent himself. The United States Supreme Court
held that the lower court chose a higher standard of competency for self-representation
than the Court itself endorsed.
93 Anne S. Kimbol, Competency Does Not Always Mean Competency, According to
the Supreme Court, HEALTH LAW PERSPECTIVES (Aug. 4, 2008, 10:09 am)
http://www.law.uh.edu/healthlaw/perspectives/2008/%28AK%29%2OEdwards.pdf
(citing Edwards, 554 U.S. at 175).
94 Id. (citing Edwards, 554 U.S. at 176).
95 Id. (citing Edwards, 554 U.S. at 176-78) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (opining that the
Constitution grants rights to a defendant who knowingly and voluntarily waives the right
to counsel to represent himself, and that there is no leeway implicit in that right for states
to substitute their own judgment for that of the defendant with respect to the right to
counsel).
96 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (questioning the Court's paternalism in even addressing
the question of a defendant's dignity and its willingness to set a higher standard based on
an appearance of a less fair trial, and noting that the majority's failure to establish a
standard for determining competency pro se "nakes a bad holding worse").
97 See generally Kimbol, supra note 93 (noting that while the law post-Edwards
makes clear there is a higher standard for self-representation when proceeding to trial, it
fails to give guidance as to what that higher standard is).
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competent to represent himself based on a mental health history.98 Further, it
limits the ability of someone with a history of mental illness to rid herself of
an attorney who refuses to listen to suggestions regarding her defense.99All
in all, the Edwards decision has been criticized for creating the potential for
the proverbial "slippery slope."' 00
Edwards is particularly influential in the arbitration context, because, as
stated, parties to an arbitration have no legal right to counsel unless that right
has been included in the contract to arbitrate. Because of this, those who are
forced to proceed pro se are not only at a distinct disadvantage because of
power imbalances between parties, but also because, drawing from the
Court's reasoning in Edwards, proceeding pro se may undermine that party's
dignity and further undermine the process of the arbitration itself. 0 '
Although Edwards did not propose any specific standard to determine a
pro se defendant's mental competency, a parallel can be drawn from the
reasoning set forth in Edwards for creating a higher competency standard for
pro se defendants and for setting a higher standard in similar situations in
civil law proceedings, such as arbitration. Arbitration shares similar policy
reasons with criminal law for creating higher competency standards for a pro
se litigant, some of which are noted in the Edwards decision.102 For example,
arbitration certainly wishes to preserve a party's dignity and to provide them
with a fair proceeding. However, as the Court in Edwards noted, a pro se
litigant may receive an unfair trial and that litigant's dignity may be
compromised if said litigant's competency is not assessed by specific
standards. 103
3. Arbitration is Binding and Subject to Limited Appeal
The lack of competency standards in arbitration, is problematic because
arbitration awards are almost always binding.104 In fact, after an arbitrator
rules, generally no reason is given for any decision and the decision is
98 Id
99 Id.
100 Id
101 See Edwards, 554 U.S. at 176 (indicating that the dignity and autonomy of an
individual underlie the right of self representation, and that an incompetent defendant
who proceeds pro se may create a spectacle and in turn humiliate himself).
102 Id at 165.
103 See id. at 176-77.
104 Moohr, supra note 84, at 1093.
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virtually final.105 As to post-arbitration proceedings, the availability of
appeal is extremely limited compared to post-trial proceedings.106
Specifically, any person who is adversely affected by an award made in an
arbitration proceeding conducted under the Administrative Dispute
Resolution Act must bring an action for review of an award pursuant to the
Federal Arbitration Act, which allows appeals only in very limited
circumstances. 107
C. Missing Standards of Competency in Arbitration
As seen, competency plays an important role in adjudicating claims, and
its importance is recognized in both civil and criminal law. Because of the
noted lack of procedural safeguards in arbitration, which a party would
otherwise be given if its claim was adjudicated in court, incompetent persons
who are forced to arbitrate a claim are at a huge disadvantage compared to
competent parties. First, power imbalances exist between the parties. For
example, because of a party's mental illness, there may be unequal cognitive
capabilities and differences in intellectual or verbal capacity, which may lead
to an inability to properly articulate a claim or explain a situation.108
Therefore, proceeding with arbitration when a party lacks fundamental
mental capacities may be inherently unfair to that party.109
Despite this general truth and despite the fact that arbitration is often
mandatory and binding, the issue of mental competency of parties to
arbitration proceedings has yet to be addressed. In fact, the only guiding
105 
_d
106 Federal Arbitration Act § 10(a), 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2006), provides that an
arbitration award may be vacated: (1) where the award was procured by corruption,
fraud, or undue means; (2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the
arbitrators, or either of them; (3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in
refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear
evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which
the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or (4) where the arbitrators exceeded their
powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the
subject matter submitted was not made.
107 5 U.S.C.A. § 581(a) (1996), referring to 9 U.S.C.A. §§ 9-13 (stating that "any
person adversely affected or aggrieved by an award made in an arbitration proceeding
conducted under this subchapter may bring an action for review of such award only
pursuant to the provisions of sections 9 through 13 of title 9").
108 See Connie J.A. Beck & Lynda E. Frost, Competence as an Element of
"Mediation Readiness, " 25 CONFLICT RESOLUTION QuARTERLY 255, 258 (2007).
109 Id at 255.
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principle that exists is found in Chapter 2, Section 2.4.2 of the Arbitration
Advocacy Handbook. In this handbook, the National Institute for Trial
Advocacy lists "unfavorable situational indications for arbitration," stating
that:
A situation unsuitable for arbitration would be where a disputant, because
of physical or mental disabilities, cannot effectively represent his or her best
interests and will not be represented by counsel at the arbitration sessions.
Such a dispute is probably best resolved in court, where a judge can appoint
counsel or an appropriate representative, guardian, etc., and where the
person will have available the full panoply of due process rights. 1 10
In a similar vein, the field of mediation, another form of alternative
dispute resolution, has failed to promulgate formal rules governing mental
competency in a mediation proceeding."I Mediators have been criticized for
relying on their "gut instinct" and rather vague guidelines which have been
provided to them through model standards, as well as mediation scholarship
which encompasses conflicting views.1 12 However, even mediation, which is
a voluntary and non-binding process,1 3 has some standards to *which
mediators can look for guidance. While not all states have codified as state
law the Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators, mediators can
nonetheless look to these standards for guidance. Those standards state:
If a party appears to have difficulty comprehending the process, issues, or
settlement options, or difficulty participating in a mediation, the mediator
should explore the circumstances and possible accommodations,
110 JOHN W. COOLEY & STEVEN LUBET, NAT'L INST. FOR TRIAL ADVOCACY,
ARBITRATION ADVOCACY, § 2.4.2 (1997).
11 See Beck, supra note 108, at 255 (articulating these concerns specifically in the
context of mediation proceedings involving incompetent parties).
112 Id. at 259-60 (proposing a specific legal standard for determining the minimum
requirements for competency in the mediation process, stating that: "A person is
incompetent to participate in mediation if he or she cannot meet the demands of a specific
mediation situation because of functional impairments that severely limit: (1) [a] rational
and factual understanding of the situation; (2) [an inability to consider options,
appreciate the impact of decisions, and make decisions consistent with his or her own
priorities; or (3) [an ability to conform his or her behavior to the ground rules of
mediation . .. ").
113 What is Mediation?, MEDIATE.COM, http://www.mediate.com/articles/what.cfm.
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modifications, or adjustments that would make possible the party's capacity
to comprehend, participate and exercise self-determination. 114
As scholars have noted, "proceeding with mediation when a party lacks
fundamental capacities is patently unfair to that party, who is thereby denied
the protections of a . .. process designed .. . to protect vulnerable parties and
ensure a just outcome." 115 Similarly, proceeding with an arbitration
proceeding when a party to the proceeding lacks "fundamental capacities" is
patently unfair to that party; and it further undermines the dignity of the
arbitration process itself.
D. Proposed Competency Standards in Arbitration: -Why Dusky and
Drope Should Apply
As noted above, competency should be addressed and taken seriously in
an arbitration proceeding. Actually assessing competency to arbitrate,
however, will prove difficult without a clear, detailed standard. For that
reason, it is helpful to draw on existing standards of competency in the field
of criminal law as it is better developed than existing standards in civil law,
and because it would provide a high standard for competency which would
promote fairness. As noted on the United States Department of Justice
website, "[t]he law governing mental health issues in the criminal context
may inform . . . decision-making with respect to a determination of
fundamental fairness."ll 6
V. ARBITRATION ORGANIZATIONS
As previously noted, assessing competency to arbitrate will prove
difficult without a clear-cut and highly detailed standard. For this reason, a
unifying legal standard is needed by which a party to an arbitration
114 Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators § VI (A)(10) (2005), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/dispute resolution/m
odelstandards conductapril2007.authcheckdam.pdf (noting that "[a] mediator shall
conduct a mediation ... in a manner that promotes ... procedural fairness, [and] party
competency. . . among all participants").
115 Beck, supra note 108, at 255.
116 See Executive Office of Immigration Review, Mental Health Benchbook,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/benchbook/tools/MHI/index.html.
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proceeding can be judged mentally competent or ready to arbitrate based on a
functional assessment of that party's capability.
However, this may be easier said than done. Because arbitration is a
private process, there is no one governing body for arbitration; nor are there
federal or state agencies that oversee arbitration procedures. The National
Academy of Arbitrators, a professional organization of arbitrators, may be
closest thing the field of arbitration has to a "governing body." 117
The procedure of arbitration is often "administered" by a private provider
organization that maintains lists of available arbitrators and provides rules
under which the arbitration will be conducted.118 While many provider
organizations exist, the two main provider organizations that provide
arbitration to private parties are JAMS and the American Arbitration
Association. Both JAMS and the American Arbitration Association have
adopted ethical codes of conduct for their arbitrators. 119 Similarly, the
National Academy of Arbitrators, while not a provider organization, has also
adopted standards of conduct.120 Despite this fact, none of the organizations'
ethical codes of conduct appear to address mental competency of the parties
(although, ironically, competency of the arbitrator is addressed in each
organization's ethical standards).121 This note contends that because JAMS,
The American Arbitration Association, and the National Academy of
Arbitrators are the main arbitration organizations, and because they have
already promulgated other ethical and procedural guidelines for arbitrators,
these entities should also be charged with promulgating mental competency
guidelines for the process of arbitration.
117 NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS, http://www.naarb.org/ (last visited
September 17, 2011).
118 See PARTRIDGE, supra note 63, at 69 (noting that service providers for
Alternative Dispute Resolution generally include both public and private organizations
which can be categorized as local, national, or international, and listing such
organizations as JAMS and the American Arbitration Association).
119 See Arbitrators Ethics Guidelines, JAMS, http://www.jamsadr.com/arbitrators-
ethics/; see also Statement of Ethical Principles, AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22036.
120 See Code of Professional Responsibility for Arbitrators of Labor-Management
Disputes, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS,
http://naarb.org/documents/NAACODE07.pdf.
121 See Arbitrators Ethics Guidelines, supra note 119; see also Statement of Ethical
Principles, supra note 119; see also Code of Professional Responsibility for Arbitrators
ofLabor-Management Disputes, supra note 120.
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A. JA MS
JAMS, originally an acronym for Judicial Arbitration and Mediation
Services, was founded in 1979 and has since grown into the largest private
Alternative Dispute Resolution provider in not just the United States, but the
world.122 At its inception, JAMS was made up of a panel of retired judges.123
Today, JAMS is a private company made up of a diverse group of neutrals
who provide arbitration, mediation, and other alternative dispute resolution
services to parties who pay a fee.124 JAMS also conducts workshops,
seminars, and outside education programs for dispute resolution processes
generally.125
In its ethical guidelines, JAMS notes that "an arbitrator should inform all
parties of the role of the arbitrator and the rules of the arbitration process"
and that "an arbitrator should ensure that all Parties understand the
arbitration process." 26 However, JAMS does not define what constitutes
"understanding" under its ethical guidelines.127 The guidelines therefore fail
to specifically address parties who may have competency issues, and further
fail to provide a course of action for an arbitrator who deems that a disputant
does not "understand" the arbitration process.
B. American Arbitration Association
The American Arbitration Association ("the Association") was founded
in 1926 and is a private, not-for-profit provider of arbitration services that
administers Alternative Dispute Resolution services from the filing of the
case to closing.128 The Association claims that it is "committed to
innovation," and also claims to "embrac[e] the highest standards of client
service achievable in every undertaking." 29 The Association further
emphasizes its strong commitment to diversity, stating that "[o]ur integrity
122 PARTRIDGE, supra note 63, at 69.
123 About the JAMS Name, JAMS, http://wwwjamsadr.com/about-the-jams-name/.
124 See Arbitrators Ethics Guidelines, supra note 119.
125 PARTRIDGE, supra note 63, at 69.
126 Arbitrators Ethics Guidelines, supra note 119 (emphasis added).
127 See generally id.
128 Statement ofEthical Principles, supra note 119; see also PARTRIDGE, supra note
63, at 69 (noting that the American Arbitration Association was founded shortly after the
Federal Arbitration Act came into effect).
129 Statement ofEthical Principles, supra note 119.
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demands impartial and fair treatment of all people with whom we come into
contact."130
The Association's Statement of Ethical Principles includes such topics as
conflict of interest avoidance, commitment to conflict management,
confidentiality, diversity, financial integrity, impartiality, information
disclosure, fairness standards, and ensuring an accessible process. 131
Interestingly, however, the Association does not impose any standards on its
arbitrators for assessing a party's level of mental competence before
proceeding with the arbitration process.
Although the Association claims "accessib[ility] of process" and a
commitment to treating "all people who [it] come[s] into contact [with]"
fairly, the Association appears to be addressing accessibility and fairness
simply in terms of monetary accessibility. 132 However, it is indisputable that
a mentally-ill party to an arbitration will not have the same "accessibility" to
the arbitration in terms of fully understanding the process, and will certainly
not be treated fairly in comparison to the treatment of a mentally competent
party to an arbitration.
C. National Academy ofArbitrators
The National Academy of Arbitrators was founded in 1947 as a not-for-
profit professional organization of arbitrators. 133 Operating both in the
United States and Canada, National Academy arbitrators hear and decide
thousands of arbitration cases each year in private industry as well as the
public sector, focusing mainly on labor and employment arbitrations. 134 The
National Academy notes that its standards are "rigorous in keeping with the
goal of establishing and fostering the highest standards of integrity and
competence." 35
In its Code of Professional Responsibility for Arbitrators of Labor-
Management Disputes, the National Academy notes that an arbitrator must
"uphold the dignity and integrity of the office and endeavor to provide
130 Id.
131 See id.
132 See id. (noting that the Association has a "fee reduction or deferral process based
on evidence of financial hardship, for parties who cannot afford to pay the AAA's
administrative fees.").
133 NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS, supra note 117.
134 Id
135 Id.
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effective service to the parties." 36 Similar to JAMS and the American
Arbitration Association, however, there are no requirements that arbitrators
assess a disputant's competency before proceeding with the arbitration, nor
are the arbitrators given recourse if they do determine that a party is mentally
incompetent. Therefore, while the National Academy claims to uphold the
dignity and integrity of the process, it fails to recognize that allowing a
mentally incompetent party to proceed with undermine the integrity of the
process significantly.
VI. OPTIONS FOR INTEGRATION
OF THE DUSKY-DROPE STANDARD OF COMPETENCY
As seen, the main arbitration organizations fail to address the issue of
mental competency to an arbitration proceeding. JAMS comes the closest to
addressing the issue by stating that the party to the proceeding must be able
to "understand" the proceeding, but nevertheless provides no guidance to
arbitrators for how to assess whether a disputant "understands" the process or
how to proceed if the arbitrator believes the party lacks sufficient
understanding to proceed.
This patchwork of ideas and standards results in an awkward and
disjointed set of recommendations that are unlikely to provide fair
evaluations of a potential disputant's competence to proceed with arbitration.
Despite the fact that competence is of particular concern in binding
arbitration, a clear statement of the minimum requirements necessary for
parties to arbitrate is nevertheless glaringly absent.
For these reasons, a party to an arbitration proceeding should not be
forced to arbitrate unless that party has properly been deemed competent
under specified competency standards. Further, arbitrators should be
required by the institution for which they work to assess competency before
arbitration procedures begin. Because criminal law provides a clear-cut test
for mental competency under the Dusky-Drope standard, which is much
easier to apply and understand than the disjointed standard set forth in civil
law, the Dusky-Drope standard for assessing mental competency should be
employed as this threshold standard in the arbitration context.
If the main arbitration agencies employed a Dusky-Drope standard, then
an arbitrator. would be forced, by their respective provider organizations, to
make an assessment of a party's competency before proceeding with the
136 Code of Professional Responsibility for Arbitrators of Labor-Management
Disputes, supra note 120.
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arbitration. A "reasonable person" standard should be employed here.
Therefore, an arbitrator would not be able to move forward if he or she
reasonably suspected that a party to the proceeding was incompetent to
proceed, and would have a duty under the laws of the arbitrator's provider
organization to have that party evaluated prior to conducting the arbitration.
While the Dusky-Drope standard is closely tailored to criminal law, and
assumes the constitutional right to assistance of counsel and the
constitutional right of a defendant to assist in his own defense, the standard
can nevertheless be tailored to the arbitration context. In the arbitration
context, then, the standard would be such that if a party to an arbitration
proceeding suffers from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally
incompetent to the point that he does not have a rational and factual
understanding of the arbitration process; if the party is unable to either assist
in or prepare his own case; or if the party is unable to consult with counsel (if
obtained) with a reasonable degree of rational understanding, then the party
shall be deemed incompetent to proceed with the arbitration. 137
VII. CONCLUSION
Arbitration, a unique form of alternative dispute resolution, is endorsed
by the legal system as being a fair and just proceeding that is an appropriate
alternative to civil litigation. Civil litigation, however, employs competency
standards that are imposed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17, which
disallows a party to sue or be sued if that party is mentally incompetent to
proceed. Contract law, a subdivision of general civil law, does not employ
specific competency standards. However, contract law is concerned with
competency as a general concept, especially in the context of contract
formation. Arbitration, however, seems to ignore the concept of mental
competency and lacks specific competency standards similar to those
employed in the civil and criminal context.
Proceeding with an arbitration when a party to the process lacks
fundamental mental capacities is unfair to the party and runs counter to the
central values of the American judicial process, which has been designed to
protect vulnerable parties and ensure a just outcome. If arbitration
proceedings continue without employing competency standards, persons who
would be declared mentally incompetent under civil competency standards
will nevertheless be forced to adjudicate claims in an arbitration proceeding.
This can lead to unjust outcomes, which are nevertheless binding on parties
137 See generally Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960); see also Drope v.
Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975).
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and which are most likely unappealable. As the Supreme Court noted, the bar
against trying an incompetent defendant is certainly "fundamental to an
adversary system of justice." 38
By creating a uniform standard for a minimally required level of
competence to arbitrate, arbitrators can ensure that the proceedings will be
more just and applied more consistently to all parties involved. Because
arbitration provider organizations already require their arbitrator-employees
to abide by certain ethical standards and guidelines, those same provider
organizations should similarly provide mental competency training to
arbitrator-employees. Also, because the competency standard in criminal law
is so clear-cut, the Dusky-Drope standard should be employed to assess
competency in the context of arbitration proceedings. Although using such a
standard raises important questions such as who is responsible for supplying
psychologists and psychiatrists to actually perform the assessments, provider
organizations, parties to the arbitration, and the states are well-equipped to
construct answers to such inquiries.
138 Drope, 420 U.S. at 172.
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